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Jurisdiction and the Internet*
Steven Betensky**
First, I am going to start with a disclaimer, as many web
pages on the Internet do. I am supposed to talk about jurisdic-
tion on the Internet. When I agreed to speak, it did not really
dawn on me that to deal with this subject as a whole is a little
bit troublesome, because personal jurisdiction is a creature of
state law.' The first place to look is at the long-arm statute of
the particular state and the cases interpreting that statute.2
Internet jurisdiction in that context would take us about five
hours. So what I am going to do is blur the differences between
states and try to talk about Internet jurisdiction generally. This
approach is more suitable to address the underlying theoretical
concerns. My disclaimer is, "kids, don't try this at home be-
* This transcript is adopted from a lecture given at the 1998 Pace Law Review
Symposium, Untangling the Web: The Legal Implications of the Internet at Pace
University School of Law on March 20, 1998.
** Steven Betensky, Esq. is a partner in White & Case, LLP. He is a graduate
of the University of Chicago School of Law and Oberlin College. He specializes in
international intellectual property and technology licensing, as well as domestic
and international commercial and intellectual property litigation.
1. See Schwartz v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 294 n.9 (6th
Cir. 1990); Ocee Industries, Inc. v. Coleman, 487 F. Supp. 548, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
2. See No Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392 PJ-H, 1998 WL
544974, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998).
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cause it probably won't be a very effective way to convince a
judge or a Court of Appeals about your case. You should ap-
proach it on a case by case basis."
With that disclaimer, I will start with a historical perspec-
tive on Internet jurisdiction. Usually, in most areas of law,
when someone gives a historical perspective he or she has far
more gray hair than I do and has been practicing law for forty
years. Luckily, I can say that Internet law really did not exist
when I got out of law school and probably did not begin as a
form of law until 1994, perhaps 1993.3 Back in those days, law-
yers were discussing theoretical questions, among them,
jurisdiction.
The Internet grew at a speed and to a size that no one ex-
pected. Equally surprising and remarkable are the number of
cases that have ruled on Internet jurisdiction issues. I will dis-
cuss a select group of cases regarding this jurisdictional issue.
The question that I want to begin with is why there have been
such a large number of Internet jurisdiction cases published
within a few short years. I think if you go back to the forties
and you ask how many cases there were concerning jurisdiction
after International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,4 you would
not find nearly as many as you might expect.
I have possible answers for why there is a tremendous wave
of Internet jurisdiction cases. It could be a "get on the band
wagon" phenomenon. What I mean by that is suddenly people
say, "the Internet is out there. This is a really nifty way of get-
ting jurisdiction over someone that I'd otherwise have to go
across the country to sue. So I am just going to use this." It is a
great little theory. Judges love to write about it.
I think the other explanation is that the Internet has
caused a huge amount of harm in a very short amount of time.
This really gets back to Professor Bick's comment about digi-
tization.5 From one perspective, you can say it is really easy for
someone without a whole lot of commercial needs and without a
3. See generally MTV Network v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(one of the earliest reported Internet cases concerning trademark infringement
and trademark dilution caused by use of the domain name "mtv.com").
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. See Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should The Internet Be Any Different, 19 PACE
L. REV. 48 (1998).
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whole lot of intent, to put something on the Internet which, in
theory, can harm a lot of people. The Internet is such a great
disseminator of information that the harm is amplified in ways
that you could not have in other traditional forms. Again, I
think that this is something that goes right to the question of
digitization, and whether the Internet is different.6
Let me try to illustrate what is at stake here with a hypo-
thetical which is based on a leading Internet jurisdiction case,
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King.7 Maybe it should not be a
leading case, but we will talk about that as well. First, let us
deal with the facts. It happens to be a Second Circuit ruling
under the New York long-arm statute.8 As with many of the
Internet jurisdiction cases, this one began with a trademark
dispute.9 In this case, the trademark was the name, "The Blue
Note."10 The trademark is owned by the Bensusan Corporation
which is the proprietor of "The Blue Note," a jazz club in New
York City, as well as other jazz clubs throughout the world."
Let us jump to 1980 when Mr. King creates "The Blue
Note" jazz club in Columbia, Missouri, which is pretty far afield
from Manhattan. 2 For the purposes of our discussion, let us
assume that the choice of the name was not a coincidence. I
think this is a critical point. There is no doubt in my mind,
though I have not read the facts presented in this case and I am
not sure what the fact finding was, that this was no coincidence.
Mr. King intended all along to evoke, at the very least, images
of the other Blue Note clubs. There was clearly an attempt to
associate his club with the other clubs. Maybe that association
was meant to evoke tradition and was not meant as a trade-
mark infringement. But for purposes of the jurisdictional ques-
tion, we should assume that there was intent to benefit from the
good name and the good will of all the other Blue Note clubs.
6. See id.
7. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Com-
puServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6 th Cir. 1996); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn Inc., 952 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold,
947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Miss. 1996).
10. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297.
11. See id.
12. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997).
1998]
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The use of "The Blue Note" perhaps was not to confuse people
into thinking they were under the same proprietorship. How-
ever, certainly there are a lot of other names in the world that
you could name your club that would not have caused that type
of confusion.
In 1993, some 13 years later, King's use of "The Blue Note"
apparently finally reaches Bensusan. Their lawyer sends a
cease and desist letter to King saying, "hey, you've got to change
the name of your club. You can't use 'The Blue Note.' We have a
registration on it."'3 Nothing remarkable happens. I think per-
haps the amount of time that it took to have a cease and desist
order go out, from 1980 to 1993, says something about the geo-
graphical locations and how widely the name was disseminated.
But that is all really conjecture.
The next part of our story takes place in 1996, when King
begins to set up a web page on a server in Missouri to be
downloaded by users of the World Wide Web. 14 This results in
the web page being seen in New York.15 That is really where
the problem comes about. Bensusan sues in New York claiming
trademark infringement based on the name and the substan-
tially similar look. 16 That is the fact pattern.
Let me go back to my original question and put this in con-
text. Is it the case that the Bensusan Corporation said, "you
know, we have really been wanting to sue these guys in Mis-
souri for a long time, but we haven't wanted to go out and get a
lawyer in Missouri. So we have been sitting quietly, but now we
have got this great thing called the Internet. Isn't it great?
They put their web page all over the U.S. and now we can get
jurisdiction over them, so we are going to sue." Or is it really a
different scenario where Bensusan sits there saying, "you know
I can live with them in Missouri. It took me thirteen years to
find out about it. I sent them the cease and desist order. I
don't know why I did not follow up on that, but now I can't toler-
ate this anymore. They have gone national. They are risking
confusion throughout the United States and the rest of the
world."? It did not take very long between April, 1996, when
13. See id.
14. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 298.
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the web page was published and when this case was decided. It
was only a matter of months. 17 That kind of immediacy is some-
thing that is special about the Internet. These are tough ques-
tions to ask. I cannot say what the motivating factor was.
The cases that are decided on Internet jurisdiction are deal-
ing with these two competing ways of looking at the world. The
question to ask is perhaps, "what is fair?" At the end of the day,
the due process question comes down to fundamental fairness.
Would it really be unfair to make the Bensusan Corporation,
which is obviously prepared to file a lawsuit in any event, liti-
gate this case in Missouri? It is possible that it would be. The
forum selection might have been important. A Missouri court
might have said, "you know we really don't find that there is a
lot of infringement. We like our local industries. We like these
guys in Columbia. We don't want them to change their name.
We don't want them to pay penalties." Bensusan may have
thought a Missouri court would be prejudiced. Is it prejudicial
for King to have to litigate in New York? Again, it is possible
that it was prejudicial to him. He did not want to litigate where
everybody knew "The Blue Note" and associated it with the jazz
club in Greenwich Village, New York. Lawyers are expensive
and so on and so forth.
At the end of the day, those are really the underlying policy
questions behind all these cases that are often not addressed by
the courts. I think that one place that you have to start, when
you are looking at Internet jurisdiction cases, is with those un-
derlying facts. We will return to what the court did in Ben-
susan in a few moments.
Now turn to the basics. How are you and the courts going
to deal with personal jurisdiction on the Internet? The place to
start is with the same general principles that underlie all other
personal jurisdiction cases, the United States Constitution.
Personal jurisdiction, as I said before, is a creature of state
law.' 8 Personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary must be de-
termined by first looking to the state's long-arm statute, and
second, looking to see whether the exercise of jurisdiction based
on that long-arm statute comports with the due process require-
17. See id. (case decided September 9, 1996).
18. See Schwartz v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 294 n.9 (6th
Cir. 1990); Ocee Industries, Inc. v. Coleman, 487 F. Supp. 548, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
1998]
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ments of the U.S. Constitution. 19 Coincidentally, there are a
number of states that say long-arm statutes should be inter-
preted so that they go as far as the Constitution allows.20 New
York is not one of those states.21 It is an interesting issue to
litigate. New York has a more limited view of what will be per-
mitted under its long-arm statute.22
There are two types of jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary,
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. 23 General jurisdic-
tion is found when the non-domiciliary is present, for all intents
and purposes, in the state. 24 Therefore, it is fair to bring any
cause of action against him.25 Usually it is a corporation or per-
haps an individual with a lot of land. Under the factors enu-
merated by the courts in all the non-Internet cases, in other
words cases over four years old, courts have found that it really
is fair to subject someone to jurisdiction on any cause of ac-
tion.26 There have been some Internet cases dealing with gen-
eral jurisdiction which are fairly well settled.27
The more difficult question for us involves specific jurisdic-
tion, where you are basing your jurisdiction on a contact which
is also the subject of the cause of action. In International Shoe,
the Court said that you must have, "certain minimum contacts
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."28 That is still the standard today, although it has been
19. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9' Cir. 1996); Re-
suscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-
M/S, 1997 WL 148567, at *3 (S.D. Ind. March 24, 1997); Uberti v. Leonardo, 892
P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961); Conn v. ITT Aetna Finance Co., 252 A.2d 184
(R.I. 1969).
21. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No.
96 CIV 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
22. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1998).
23. See CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17, 20 (N.D. Tex 1997).
24. See generally Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See generally Haelan Products Inc. v. Beso Biological, 43 U.S. P.Q.2d 1672
(E.D. La. 1997).
28. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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commented on to a large extent by subsequent cases. 29 What
does it mean though? According to Hanson v. Denckla,30 a de-
fendant can establish those minimum contacts by committing
some act by which he "purposefully avails [himself] of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state," thus invok-
ing the benefits and protections of its laws.31 Courts in such
cases look at whether or not the defendant has done something
to thrust himself into the state, seeking the protection of an-
other state's law, so that it would be fair to bring him to court. 32
Those cases are fairly easy to resolve when they deal with busi-
ness activities. Did you start a company? Did you own land?
Here, however, you are looking to another state to protect your
interests.
On the Internet, it is a little bit more amorphous. As we
will see, the necessary contacts go back to the traditional rules
espoused by the Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz.33 There,
the Court held that the contact between the non-domiciliary
and the state in which jurisdiction is sought must be of a nature
such that the individual non-resident defendant "should reason-
ably anticipate being haled into court there."34 Of course rea-
sonableness and what you anticipate largely depends on what
courts are going to do. That may be a "which came first the
chicken or the egg" problem. But it is certainly a relevant ques-
tion on the Internet. We are not quite sure what anyone ex-
pects because there has not been a lot of time for anyone to
figure out what constitutes minimum contacts. Minimum con-
tacts vary with the quality and the nature of the defendant's
activities. So again, we have to look at the defendant's actions
to figure out whether or not it is fair to maintain jurisdiction
over him in that state. This is the constitutional question.
What we will find out, as we talk about some of the cases, is
29. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
30. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
32. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, No. 95-3452, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17837, at *14 (6t' Cir.).
33. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
34. Id. at 474.
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that in particular jurisdictions you do not get to that level. The
actual state long-arm statute stops you before you get there.
So what does this mean for the Internet and how do these
cases pan out? I think with the perspective of many years of
Internet cases, we can see that there are three categories
emerging for the millennium. This really comes out of Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,35 in which the court
suggests a tripartite division.36 There are Internet cases involv-
ing contracts entered into through a web site, others that in-
volve interactive web sites, and those with passive web sites.37 I
will talk about each of these in turn and then talk about some of
the cases that rule on these issues.
Beginning with contracts entered into through a website,
the first question that pops to mind is, "why would the Internet
be any different? Why should it make any difference that I cre-
ate a contract electronically via e-mail with someone I agree to
buy goods or services from in the forum state?" Sending e-mail
is, in effect, a writing. Essentially, the courts say that if you are
doing business in another state, entering into contracts of sig-
nificant commercial value in that state, and if it is part of your
business, you should at this point reasonably expect to be haled
into court in that location. 38 The courts are going to treat e-mail
and the Internet just as though you had sent a letter or had
written a contract.39
Frankly, these standards are not particularly high. For ex-
ample, an insurance company may be found to do business with
a customer when it is sending confirmations and bills. If you
compare the non-Internet cases where there are people doing
business in the state, it is not a very high standard. So really,
these cases are not that troublesome. In Zippo, the court said
that if the defendant enters into a contract with a member of a
foreign jurisdiction that involved the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet, jurisdiction is
proper.40 This sheds some light on an issue that was not always
35. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
36. See id. at 1124.
37. See id.
38. See id; see also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-66 (6 th
Cir. 1996).
39. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
40. See id. at 1126.
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clear: when would there be jurisdiction? Since the contract was
created in cyberspace and cyberspace has not yet achieved
statehood, we do not know where cyberspace is and where juris-
diction should be. The answer to this dilemma is that it is like
any other piece of communication, and jurisdiction would be
proper based on the contracts entered into by the parties.
One of the first cases dealing with this issue was Com-
puServe, Inc. v. Patterson.41 In this case, Patterson, a Texas
resident, entered into what was called a share-ware registration
grant (SRA) with CompuServe, an Ohio based corporation. 42
CompuServe stored and distributed Patterson's software in ex-
change for 15% of Patterson's sales. 43 Thus, there was a com-
mercial relationship going on between the two parties. 44 The
twist was that this SRA agreement was entered into electroni-
cally.45 Patterson learned that CompuServe was marketing
products similar to his own. He started complaining about
trademark infringement and deceptive trade practices. 46 Com-
puServe filed for a declaratory judgment claiming it had not in-
fringed on any common law trademarks or engaged in any
deceptive trade practices.4 7 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held
that Patterson "purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
doing business in Ohio" by entering into the SRA with Com-
puServe.48 I do not think there is a whole lot of dispute over
that result. CompuServe entered into contracts. Patterson en-
tered into contracts with an Ohio company to sell his software
and was getting money from CompuServe. 49 I do not think that
is a particularly contentious result.
In Zippo, the court also found that the defendant's contacts
with Pennsylvania were sufficient to allow jurisdiction.5 0 The
defendant contracted with approximately three thousand indi-
viduals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania to
41. 89 F.3d 1257 (6 th Cir. 1996).
42. See id. at 1260.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1264.
45. See id. at 1261.
46. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1266.
49. See id. at 1257.
50. See Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1128
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
1998]
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allow them to download certain messages. 51 This was the basis
of the suit. So again, this is another case where you have con-
tractual activity between the residents of the state where juris-
diction is being sought, and the individual that is being sued.
The court finds that it is fully fair and appropriate for the indi-
vidual to be sued where all of those contracts were entered into,
even if they may have been entered into in other states as
well. 52
Another similar case is Digital Equipment Corporation v.
Alta Vista Technology, Inc.53 This case comes out of a trade-
mark arrangement between Digital and Alta Vista. 54 Digital
took the trademark of Alta Vista and used it for its Internet
search engine.55 The agreement provided that Alta Vista Tech-
nology Corp. Inc. could only use the Alta Vista portion of its
name as part of its company name.56 Alta Vista, however, pro-
ceeded to create a web page that really made it look as though it
was responsible for the Alta Vista search engine. 57 Digital did
not appreciate that and sued Alta Vista.58 Clearly, there was a
contract between Digital based in Massachusetts, and the de-
fendant, Alta Vista. There was no reason to think that it should
be treated any differently than if the contracts had all been
done in writing. The court held that business was transacted in
Massachusetts, and that the web site caused tortious injury in
Massachusetts. 59 Therefore, there should be jurisdiction in
Massachusetts.60 These cases, I think, are pretty well settled,
and that is a good thing, because I think everyone practicing in
this area of the law had hoped that at least these cases, which
were not that tough, would be resolved in a rational way.
The next category of cases involves interactive web sites.
The first question to ask is, "what is an interactive web site?" I
think the Zippo court defines an interactive web site as a web
51. See id. at 1128.
52. See id. at 1121.
53. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
54. See id. at 459.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 460.
58. See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 461.
59. See id. at 456.
60. See id.
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site where you exchange information.61 Perhaps a search en-
gine would be an interactive web site. The user does not enter
into a contract with a search engine, but the user asks it to
search for a firm on the Internet. Does the user have a relation-
ship with that web site? The user knows that there is some ser-
vice being provided. This might be an interactive web site.
What about e-mail? Some courts that have found that a
web site that allows you to send e-mail to it or the organization
is an interactive web site. 62 For me, that means that every web
site is interactive, because sending e-mail to a web site is not
particularly out of the ordinary. That is part of being on the
Internet.
Talking about interactive web sites becomes problematic
because it is not clear where one begins and the other ends. In
any event, you can define the cases. Maybe it helps, on a theo-
retical basis, to define interactive web sites as web sites where
there is some interplay between the user, wherever that user
may be located, and the operator of the web site.
In Zippo, the court found that the likelihood that jurisdic-
tion can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportional to
the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet. 63 I think that this is undoubtedly
true. It is kind of like saying, "there is a spectrum between hav-
ing business contacts over the Internet, and doing absolutely
nothing but having a web site. Whether or not jurisdiction is
proper is going to fall somewhere in between." Is that helpful?
I am not sure.
The following factors, that I have pulled out of cases, may
be helpful in determining whether an interactive web site
should be the basis for jurisdiction. 64 First, is the user asked to
sign in or register on the web site?65 If so, that is a factor that
indicates that they may be more amenable to jurisdiction
elsewhere. 66
61. See Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
62. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Con-
seco, Inc., v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816, 820 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
63. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
64. See infra notes 65-73.
65. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
66. See id. at 1125.
19981
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Second, does the defendant enter into agreements through
the web site?67 If so, then you would probably have jurisdiction
over the contracts. 68
Third, can the user e-mail the web site?69
Fourth, has the defendant's site been accessed by users lo-
cated in the forum state?70 This factor seems relevant in theory.
If absolutely no one from the forum state has accessed the par-
ticular web site, it would be more difficult to claim that there is
jurisdiction.
Fifth, is the site commercial in nature?71 Frankly, I think
that is a huge factor in all of these cases. I think that there is a
real bias against invoking jurisdiction against non-commercial
entities or semi-commercial entities. Certainly, if it is a non-
commercial site, the court is going to have to look hard at it.
Sixth, does the defendant actively solicit sales through the
site?7 2 Is that a contract? Or is that an offer for solicitation? If
you are looking for sales, or in some cases donations on your
web site, and you put an 800 number on it, chances are a court
may look at that and say you are trying to do business, even
though no one may have given you a donation.
Finally, is the web site primarily local or does it serve a
national market, as in the Bensusan case?7 3 As we know, in a
typical scenario the World Wide Web is global in fact, and not
local. I do not believe that there are very many entities that
restrict their web site access only to a local audience. You could
have it so it would probably make it an interactive web site per
se if you required someone to log on and declare that they are a
67. See Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No.
IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 14567, at *3 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at
1125; Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
68. See Resuscitation Technologies, 1997 WL 148567, at *6; Zippo, 952 F.
Supp. at 1124; Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401, 402.
69. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 994 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D. Mass. 1997).
70. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997);
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
71. See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6 th Cir. 1996).
72. See Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997); Gary Scott Ralph Int'l,
Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997).
73. See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D. N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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resident of the State of Missouri. Practically the only web sites
that do that are ones that are trying to prevent minors from
accessing adult-oriented material. These web sites require the
user to log in with an assigned subscription. You could do all of
that, and of course in the Bensusan case, using that as our hy-
pothetical fact pattern, King could have said, "well I am really
only trying to get these people at the University of Missouri, so I
am going to put a subscription page on my site. If you are not
from the University of Missouri you can't get on my page." I
don't know what that case would have turned up, if it actually
made its way to court, but in any event that is certainly some-
thing that courts are going to look at.
Whether the web site is local or national, the existence of
an 800 number has been found, when displayed on the adver-
tisement or on the web site, to make it an "interactive site."
74
This is because you can just pick up the phone and, if it is an
800 number, presumably call toll-free anywhere in the United
States. That means you are trying to actively solicit business in
those states. Those are just some of the factors that the courts
look at.
Briefly, let me hit on some of the key cases and what the
specific courts have done. One of the leading cases, in what I
would call the interactive category, is Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc. 75 In that case, the defendant used its web site to promote
its upcoming Internet service.7 6 The court found that jurisdic-
tion was proper because the web site was accessible to an esti-
mated 12,000 Missouri-based Internet users.7 7 In fact, it was
accessed by Missouri Internet users all 311 times.78 Appar-
ently, about half of those were by the plaintiff.7 9 In any event,
we probably should not count those, but there was activity. The
site advertised the services of the defendant.80 The web site, in
74. See, e.g., Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F.Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's characterization of web site as "passive" where the home
page contains a 1-800 number to solicit contributions in the fight against cystic
fibrosis).
75. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
76. See id. at 1330.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
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that instance, really promoted the ability of the web site pro-
vider's business to work anywhere in the world. Thus, the
court held that they provide computer technology to thousands
of people around the world.8' This is a commercial enterprise
that is looking for national and international business. Many
courts have held that simply putting a web page on the Internet
does not confer jurisdiction because it is passive.8 2 Why an 800
number or e-mail should make any difference is something that
may be debated.
In another case, Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,8 3 the
court again found that the defendant had purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the District of
Columbia by soliciting donations on its web site and in the local
newspaper.8 4 It may well be that the newspaper was the dis-
positive factor, not the web site. The fact that they put ads in
The Washington Post in order to get donations gave the appear-
ance that the defendant was purposefully availing itself of the
jurisdiction in order to get business donations.88
A more recent case is Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.8 6
This is another domain name case, where Clue Computing, a
computer consultant firm based in Colorado, had acquired the
domain name clue.com. 87 Hasbro decided it liked that domain
name and wanted to use it. Hasbro probably wanted use it to
sell its Clue board game or to have a web site based on the Clue
game.88 There was no evidence, according to the court, to indi-
cate that this is a "cyber-squatter" case.8 9 A cyber-squatter case
is where someone comes in and takes the Clue name merely to
deny it to Hasbro and extort funds. 90 What the court found was
81. See id. at 1333.
82. See Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997).
83. 958 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1996).
84. See id. at 5.
85. See id. at 3.
86. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
87. See id. at 38.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 37.
90. Cyber-squatters are "individuals [that] attempt to profit from the Internet
by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain names back to the companies
that spent millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trademark." In-
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that Clue Computing was a world-wide entity.91 In fact, Clue
says that they will go anywhere to help their customers. 92 The
court held them to their word and said, "if you're going to go
anywhere to help your customers, you can go anywhere to liti-
gate as well."93 The court concluded that the exercise of juris-
diction was proper. 94 If you look at the case, it looks as though
it was decided on the fact that the user could send e-mail to the
proprietor of the web site. I personally think that is not a fan-
tastic criteria. I think that the court was probably equally per-
suaded by some factors it did not articulate.
The next case, Panavision v. Toeppen,95 is also a cyber-
squatter case. It is an interesting one because the court in Cali-
fornia found the alleged facts were that someone obtained the
panavision.com domain name and then tried to get Panavision
to pay for it.96 Panavision alleged that the defendant was not
legitimately using the domain name panavision.com. 97 Rather,
the defendant obtained the name solely to sell the domain name
to Panavision.98 The court found that the defendant's actions
were anything but "random, fortuitous or attenuated."99 The
court also found that this "cyber-squatter" had directed its ac-
tivities to Panavision. 100 The directed activity targeted a Cali-
fornia entity and caused harmful effects in California. Thus,
this activity subjected the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
California court. 1 1
The court assumes for purposes of jurisdiction that a plain-
tiffs allegations are true.10 2 The court must look at the specific
facts in a complaint. 10 3 In Bensusan, the court had to discern
termatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 96 Civ. 1982, 1996 WL 716892, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
26, 1996).
91. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 38.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 44.
94. See id. at 46.
95. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
96. See id. at 616.
97. See id. at 619.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 622 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985)).
100. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 621.
103. See id. at 620.
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whether King's "The Blue Note" web page was "random, fortui-
tous or attenuated" or whether that web page targeted New
York and other "The Blue Note" club locations. 04
The last category is the passive web site. The dividing line
between a passive and an interactive web site is not clear.
Some courts have found that e-mail contact with the web site
proprietor distinguishes an active web site from a passive
one. 0 5 Other courts have held that web sites with the same e-
mail contacts are passive sites.10 6 It seems that the courts in
these cases are looking to the slippery slope. They are con-
cerned about creating law that will make an individual subject
to jurisdiction anywhere in the United States, or the world, by
the mere creation of a web site.
Hearst v. Goldberger,0 7 is one of a host of cases on this is-
sue. The Hearst court states that finding jurisdiction based on
an Internet web site would mean there would be nationwide,
world-wide, personal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who
establishes an Internet web site. 08 The court further states
that such nationwide jurisdiction is inconsistent with tradi-
tional personal jurisdiction case law and unacceptable to the
courts as a matter of policy. 10 9 The Hearst court expressed a
valid concern about the potentially unlimited jurisdiction based
on an Internet web site. 1 0 The court did state that if an indi-
vidual or entity is harming people, however, that individual
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the court where the harm
took place."'
104. Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2 d Cir. 1997).
105. See Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816, 820 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) (concluding that the ability to send and receive e-mail from a web site makes
that site "interactive").
106. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stating that even though the defendant Cyersell's web site could receive the
browser's name and address via e-mail, Cybersell's home page is essentially
passive).
107. No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
108. See id. at *1.
109. See id.
110. See id. at *16.
111. See id. at *24.
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Another policy point is made in one of the first Internet
cases, Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.112 An Arizona corpora-
tion uses the mark "Cybersell" in connection with imminent
web advisors. 113 A Florida corporation uses the mark "Cyber-
Sell Inc." for a business consulting service on its web page. 1 4
The Florida web page says, "Welcome to CyberSell!"1 5 The Ari-
zona plaintiff filed a trademark infringement suit. 1 6 The court
found that the essentially passive nature of the defendant's ac-
tivity in hosting a home page did not qualify as purposeful ac-
tivity invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona laws.1 17
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction.18 This was a "passive case" and
the court should not be able to exercise jurisdiction.
It is relevant that the site received no "hits" from Arizona
residents, other than the plaintiff.1 9 Other relevant factors for
the court to consider are whether there is evidence that any Ari-
zona residents signed up for the defendant's services, or
whether there are any contacts with Arizona residents. 20 In
this case, there was no 1-800 number. 12' There were no sales
and no income. 22 It appears that the court will determine that
the web site is passive if it displays none of the factors the court
uses to determine whether the web site is interactive.
Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King 23 is an interest-
ing hypothetical and one close to home. On appeal the court
ignores, and rightfully so, the District Court's finding under the
Due Process Clause.124 The Second Circuit found that the New
York long-arm statute did not reach the defendant because the
112. 130 F.3d 414 (9' Cir. 1997).
113. See id. at 415.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 416.
117. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
118. See id. at 419.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
123. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
124. See Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King, 126 F.3d 25 ( 2nd Cir.
1997).
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defendant was not physically present in New York. 125 There-
fore, he did not commit a tort in New York.126
The court looked at other factors, but it is relevant that in
Bensusan, the Court of Appeals essentially said that the New
York long-arm statute would not be invoked if an individual in
New Jersey lobbed a shell into New York and caused a tort. 127
That action would not make the New Jersey individual subject
to jurisdiction in New York. If Bensusan is the standard, the
court is not going to find jurisdiction. Take your lawsuit else-
where. It is a very restrictive reading of a long-arm statute.
The Bensusan court did not discuss all the details that we have
talked about today. It has been cited by a number of other
cases, perhaps sadly, for the proposition that passive web sites
should not make one amenable to jurisdiction.128 Whether that
is really true for those cases that are citing it is another matter.
I will move quickly onto Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger.129 The
defendant in this case established a web site under es-
qwire.com, offering computer services and legal information to
attorneys. 30 Esquire Magazine, owned by Hearst, brought a
lawsuit claiming trademark infringement.13 ' The court found
that esqwire.com was a passive web site, most analogous to a
national magazine, not targeted to residents of New York or any
particular state and therefore, jurisdiction was not proper. 32
I think it is clear that the passive cases are the most troub-
ling. The court is forced to choose between finding jurisdiction
when the proprietor of a web site is in a foreign state and has
merely put up a web site and all other cases where there may be
substantial harm in a foreign state created by that presence. I
am not so sure that putting information on the Internet is so
passive to begin with. You are certainly disseminating informa-
125. See id. at 29.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 27.
128. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417-18 (9 th Cir. 1997);
Hearst v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997);
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
129. See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097.
130. See id.
131. See id. at *5.
132. See id. at *27.
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tion. You are disseminating it on a global basis. This is not a
passive act in all cases.
The next question is what is different about the Internet?
The best analogy we have for a passive Internet case is if some-
one distributed a national journal at every airport in the coun-
try. Perhaps a better example is one where the person puts
huge stacks of free journals in the airport in Washington, D.C.
People take the journals to every other airport. They put their
own piles down. Everyone has the journal and before you know
it, the whole country has the journal. The defendant says, "well
I just put them in one little airport." The difference, of course, is
that it would really be hard to disseminate any sort of journal
across the entire United States without putting a lot of money
into it. Distributors are paid. It is a business to get magazines
out and when you look, as the courts do, at the newspaper cases,
you lose the commercial element.
In traditional cases, Hertz System, Inc. v. Hervis Corpora-
tion133 and Gordy v. Daily News, 34 courts have tried to deter-
mine whether exercising jurisdiction is appropriate. There, the
courts held that putting an ad in a national journal does not
subject someone to jurisdiction for trademark infringement. 35 I
am not sure whether you can really compare them because they
are quite different animals.
On the Internet, you are able to disseminate information
throughout the entire globe. In fact, from one web site you do
not need to spend a million dollars to distribute. You do not
need to hire shippers, and you do not need any sort of commer-
cial business to get the information out. So, in the passive
cases, frequently there will be someone using the Internet for a
non-commercial use, but nonetheless creating a lot of harm.
That is a tough case. Even though the defendant passively put
something on the web for the world to see, a court in a foreign
jurisdiction can ask, "why should the plaintiff have to travel to
the defendant's state when he is being harmed in his own
state?" I think that this is something we will see more of in the
future. There is no question that there is a lot of disagreement
133. 549 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
134. 95 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 1996).
135. See Hertz, 549 F. Supp. at 797.
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among the courts as to how the passive cases should come out. I
am sure there is disagreement among the attorneys as well.
The next area where there are only a few cases and where I
think that there are future issues, is international jurisdiction.
I think this area will present the biggest problem. There have
been several cases that have addressed whether a web site from
an international defendant makes that defendant amenable to
general jurisdiction anywhere in the United States.136
In Weber v. Jolly Hotels 37 the court found that creating a
web site did not create jurisdiction over an international de-
fendant.138 In Weber, an Italian hotel put up a web site.139 The
plaintiff slipped and fell in the hotel in Italy and then sued in
his home state. 40 This scenario creates a fairly classic jurisdic-
tion question. Is it fair to drag that Italian hotel to the United
States merely because they have a passive web site advertising
the hotel where the slip occurred? I think that if the court came
out the other way, it would open a whole host of problems.
Taking the scenario one step further, instead of the slip and
fall case, consider what some call a "data haven" in the Carib-
bean. There are no intellectual property protections there. A
person merely makes a facsimile of Playboy and creates their
own version of playboy.com. The person puts the web site on a
server and makes advertising revenue from it. Would a court
find that there is jurisdiction in any state? I think the court
would go after them and find personal jurisdiction because
there would be such harm, and the web site is so targeted to all
states. Maybe the answer is in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, particularly Rule 42.141 Rule 42 looks at instances where
there is no jurisdiction in any particular state and finds nation-
wide jurisdiction for federal causes of action. 142 There are no
cases on this issue which are helpful.
136. See, e.g., Agar Corp. v. Multi-Fluid, Inc. 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1444 (S.D. Tex.
June 25, 1997).
137. 977 F. Supp. 327 (D. N.J. 1997).
138. See id. at 334.
139. See id. at 329.
140. See id.
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
142. See id.
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Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks,
Ltd.143 deals with a trademark infringement question. I think
the case was in New York and Massachusetts. That court found
that there was no jurisdiction over a Canadian defendant.'"
The court held that it was not fair for them to have to litigate in
the United States.145 It would offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 146 Maybe that is not the right case,
but I think that there will be cases where foreign entities are
brought into the United States and where jurisdiction will be
found, certainly in the gambling cases.
There have been a bunch of arrests and other lawsuits
against proprietors of gambling cites. 147 I have no doubt that
the individual states and the federal government are going to
seek to regulate information entering the United States over
the Internet wherever they can. It is going to start to push the
boundaries of personal jurisdiction. But, that is the way it goes.
The one query, of course, is do we want it the other way? There
are many other countries where I frankly do not want to get off
the plane and be arrested for what I put on my web site because
it happens to offend that particular country's morality or idea of
what is theologically proper. I do not think we would like that
result so I think we really must think through what the right
answers are going to be.
In closing, I will leave with one final question. Are we re-
ally asking the right question today? I have been talking today
about where the courts should find Internet jurisdiction and
whether or not the Internet is something different. Maybe we
are going to have to take a long-term perspective on this ques-
tion. Has the Internet changed the landscape of the legal envi-
ronment in our world so much that the traditional cases, which
are cited in all of these Internet cases, are really a little less
relevant than before. It is not simply that air travel is avail-
able, but I know, certainly in my practice, I do an incredible
amount of work from what you could call a virtual office. It is
143. 955 F. Supp. 220, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
144. See id. at 231.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See generally Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.
Tex. 1998).
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certainly less difficult for someone to litigate in Missouri now
than it was forty years ago. I think as time goes on we have to
ask whether the policy basis upon which these older Supreme
Court cases were based really needs to be challenged. Whether
it is an Internet jurisdiction case or some other case, the hard-
ship of traveling to another jurisdiction is really becoming a lot
less significant. Again, this is not an Internet and the law ques-
tion. It is a question of law generally, and how the Internet im-
pacts our world.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/1
